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Following the footprints of the ‘postmodern turn’: 
A reply to Gregor McLennan 
 
Simon Susen 
 
 
 
I am enormously grateful to Gregor McLennan for commenting on my book 
The ‘postmodern turn’ in the social sciences (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2015). Furthermore, I am indebted to the editors of the 
European Journal of Cultural and Political Sociology for providing me with 
the opportunity to respond to his remarks. In my Reply, I shall focus on 
some central issues raised by McLennan in his thoughtful review article.1 
 
1. Common ground 
Let me stress at the outset that, although McLennan’s critical comments 
and the cynical undertone of large parts of his review article may create 
the impression that the differences between our respective positions are 
profound, it seems to me that, upon reflection, we agree on most of the key 
issues in question. Arguably, the most significant common ground between 
us concerns our defence of the progressive dimensions of modernity in 
general and of the Enlightenment in particular. Characterising ‘[my] own 
preferred stance’ as ‘a kind of qualified modernism’ (italics added), 
McLennan explicitly states that, overall, he finds my own perspective – as 
developed and advocated in Chapter 6 of my book – ‘intelligent and 
persuasive’. As he rightly asserts, ‘broadly speaking it reflects the majority 
mindset in social theory’. It must be emphasised, however, that the detailed 
underpinnings of this normative outlook are far from homogenous and 
differ substantially between various attempts to expose both the 
empowering and the disempowering features of the ‘modes of social life or 
organisation which emerged in Europe from about the seventeenth century 
onwards and which subsequently became more or less worldwide in their 
influence’2. 
 
 In other words, critical social theory needs to face up to the deep 
ambivalence of modernity – that is, it needs to shed light on both its dark 
and its bright dimensions. The disempowering facets of modernity 
‘emanate from the quest for domination, epitomized in the historical impact 
of instrumental reason’ (Susen, 2015, p. 17, italics in original). By contrast, the 
empowering aspects of modernity, whilst contributing to the emancipation 
of human actors, ‘can be uncovered by critical reason’ (Susen, 2015, p. 17, 
italics in original). The former ‘are intimately associated with variations of 
control – such as power, authority, order, discipline, obedience, enclosure, 
and heteronomy – and materialize themselves in social processes of 
domination, regulation, exploitation, alienation, fragmentation, exclusion, 
and discrimination’ (Susen, 2015, p. 17). The latter are ‘expressed in 
Enlightenment ideals – such as progress, tolerance, liberty, equality, 
solidarity, dignity, sovereignty, and autonomy – and manifest themselves in 
social processes of liberation, self-determination, and unification’ (Susen, 
2015, p. 17). It is this sort of ‘qualified modernism’3 upon whose cogency 
and usefulness McLennan and I appear to agree. 
Let me, in the remainder of this Reply, address some of the critical points 
that McLennan makes in his review article. 
 
2. Purpose 
In the opening paragraph of his review article, McLennan characterises the 
overall purpose of my book as follows: 
One claim to distinction is Susen’s intention to provide the sort of 
comprehensive thematic mapping that will get beneath the level of more 
accentuated or descriptive approaches to postmodernism, which tend to 
be couched in terms of individual thinkers, selective issues, and 
individual disciplines. The second notable feature is that Susen offers his 
own considered verdict on the central contentions, whilst decently 
striving to keep this somewhat apart from, and subsequent to, his more 
open-ended exegeses and exemplifications. The purpose is thus 
somewhat encyclopaedic in a traditional sense (italics added). 
 
As should be obvious to the attentive reader, McLennan contradicts 
himself in this passage. The purpose of my book is not ‘somewhat 
encyclopaedic in a traditional sense’ (italics added), since – as McLennan 
perceptively observes – it aims to reach ‘beneath the level of more 
accentuated or descriptive approaches to postmodernism’ (italics added), 
whilst offering a ‘considered verdict’ (italics added) on, and hence making 
 an informed judgement about, crucial assertions, positions, and arguments 
endorsed by defenders of postmodern thought. My study is not intended to 
be merely descriptive, let alone exhaustive or conclusive.4 Rather, it 
provides an aspect-oriented, analytical, and critical account of the impact 
that the ‘postmodern turn’ has had, and continues to have, on the 
contemporary social sciences.5 
 
3. Distance 
McLennan rightly states that, although my book offers an interdisciplinary 
overview of the impact of the ‘postmodern turn’ on the social sciences, it 
fails to consider the pivotal role played by one discipline: economics. Surely, 
one may add other social-scientific disciplines to the list – notably, 
anthropology, social psychology, and criminology. In fact, if one expands 
the explorative territory to the humanities more widely, then literary 
theory, art, art history, architecture, and cultural studies would be obvious 
candidates. Granted, the analysis of the five broad fields of enquiry 
covered in my book – that is, (I) epistemology, (II) social research 
methodology, (III) sociology, (IV) historiography, and (V) politics – is far from 
complete. One may put forward different arguments as to why some areas 
of investigation deserve, or do not deserve, to be prioritised over others. Let 
us, in this context, turn our attention to the following assessment made by 
McLennan: 
The chapters proceed by identifying a core conceptual ‘turn’ that 
postmodern challenges to the reigning modernist assumptions have 
triggered – thus, the relativist turn in epistemology, the interpretive turn 
in methodology, the cultural turn in sociology, the contingent turn in 
historiography, and the autonomous turn in politics. This architecture 
works reasonably well, and the various domains and turns are 
knowledgeably developed. 
This may sound like a pedantic point, but it is striking that, in his review 
article, McLennan does not pick up on the fact that, in my book, the 
aforementioned paradigmatic shifts  are referred to in inverted  commas: 
(I) the  ‘relativist  turn’, (II) the ‘interpretive turn’, (III) the ‘cultural turn’, 
(IV) the ‘contingent turn’, and (V) the ‘autonomous turn’. The same applies 
to the major paradigmatic transition under which these shifts are 
subsumed: the formulation ‘postmodern turn’ appears in inverted commas 
throughout the study, including in its title.6 At ﬁrst glance, this remark may 
appear to be a matter of academic hair-splitting and intellectualist 
quibbling. It is worth emphasising, however, that the aforementioned 
 inverted commas – largely ignored by McLennan in his review article – are 
meant to express a critical distance between the author and the 
paradigmatic turns in question, indicating that their existence, let alone 
their validity, must not be taken for granted. 
 
4. Failure (?) 
The most central critical remark made by McLennan in his assessment of 
my study is the following assertion: ‘I do not think that the book ultimately 
succeeds.’ Obviously, after years of hard work on what seemed to be an 
interminable research project, an author does not wish to be confronted 
with this kind of harsh evaluation.7  For the sake of clarity, let us discern the 
principal claims that McLennan makes in relation to this – rather 
discouraging – conclusion. 
 
4.1. Readership 
A noteworthy problem that McLennan mentions in this regard concerns 
the question of the book’s intended readership: 
The first major problem is that it is hard to see exactly whom this dense 
and overlapping series of accounts is aimed at, or who is going to be 
greatly motivated by it. And with a book dealing with postmodernism, 
this can hardly be a secondary or innocent question. 
In addition, McLennan complains that neither Bryan S. Turner, ‘in his 
prefatory praise for the book’, nor I, ‘over the course of a 40-page 
introduction’, ‘bother to identify who the typical reader might be, or in 
what ways they might consider themselves ediﬁed’ (italics added, quotation 
modiﬁed). In this context, McLennan draws attention to the genre known 
as ‘rhetoric of enquiry’, which posits that that textual productions ‘should 
be appreciated on the basis of whom they might be for before we decide 
exactly what they are about or how good they are in some vacant general 
sense’ (italics in original). 
The question that I ask myself in response to this objection is why the 
profile of the addressee should  be  made  explicit. When you  get  dressed 
in the morning, should you make it obvious for whom and/or  why  you  
are putting on a particular set of clothes?  Obviously,  the  answer  is  ‘no’.  
Perhaps, given the  commodified nature of  the  academic publishing 
industry in the twenty-first century, one might not be surprised by the fact 
that even astute and intellectually autonomous scholars, such as 
 McLennan, appear to take the view that authors should specify at what 
kind of readership their books are aimed. It seems, then, that selling 
books is not  dissimilar  to  vending toys: market strategists need to know 
which particular groups of people possess the cognitive resources 
necessary for them to find the item that they are  buying both  appropriate 
and interesting. 
Should we preface academic books with descriptions of those who may 
be interested in them, classifying suitable readership groups in terms of key 
sociological variables (such as class, gender, ethnicity, age, ability, 
ideological affiliation, disciplinary profile, and educational background)? Of 
course, I am being facetious – but, actually, this is a serious point, for it would 
be silly, and potentially patronising, ‘to identify who the typical reader 
might be’. Creative writers – who are immersed in specific epistemic and 
stylistic horizons, which can be as diverse as academic research, fiction, or 
poetry – may have a particular readership for their works in mind; there is 
no categorically applicable reason, however, why it should be considered a 
‘must’ to make the addressees of their outputs explicit. Such kind of 
performative utilitarianism would kill off the imaginative spirit that is 
essential to adventurous modes of enquiry, which refuse to be dictated by 
rigid parameters of clearly defined target audiences. 
 
4.2. Familiarity 
Another significant problem that McLennan discusses in this context 
relates to the familiarity of the book’s key theme. In relation to the 
question of suitable readership, McLennan contends that ‘[t]he most 
obvious collective candidate is the set of peers and teachers of social 
theory in this academic area’ (italics added). McLennan goes on to make 
fun of Zygmunt Bauman’s blurb that ‘the rest of us’ – which, in his eyes, 
implies ‘most of us’ – ‘now have some catching up to do’. To this 
provocative statement, he objects that ‘this is a very familiar topic field’ 
(italics in original); thus, in his opinion, there is no need for yet another 
book on this subject. McLennan appears to forget, however, that the  fact 
that something is familiar to us does not mean that we understand it. 
Indeed, it is one of the basic insights of sociological investigation that 
familiarity is a tricky affair, since it tends to give us the illusionary 
impression that we comprehend something merely because it is known to 
us. Yet, familiarity based on taken-for-grantedness is by no means a  
guarantee  of  critical understanding. Just as we must not confuse practical 
knowledge (‘know how’) with theoretical knowledge (‘know that’), we 
must not assume that we can grasp the constitution and development of a 
 particular phenomenon simply because we are, or at least appear to be, 
familiar with it. It is true that, as illustrated by my study8, countless books 
and articles grappling with the concept of ‘the postmodern’ have been 
written, but this is in no way a reliable indicator of the fact that we – as 
critical researchers – have reached an accurate understanding of its 
complexity. 
 
4.3. Systematicity 
A further problem that McLennan discusses in this context relates to the 
systematicity of the book’s analysis. 
Susen’s book at least now becomes the most systematic treatment available; 
but down these well-worn tracks it is not clear that what we are in need of is 
greater systematicity, or that the latter brings notably greater insight (italics 
added). 
Given the arguably ‘anti-systematic’ nature of postmodern thought, the 
aim of providing a systematic account of its numerous facets, premises, 
and propositions was one of the most challenging aspects of my 
undertaking. Undoubtedly, if this task is (mis-) understood as the narrow 
goal of offering a methodical overview solely for the sake of systematicity, 
then it defeats the point – and, indeed, undermines the underlying 
rationale – of my entire project. If such an ambition is driven merely by the 
scholastic attempt to develop a pristine ediﬁce of conceptual 
constructions, embedded in a descriptivist inventory that is tantamount to 
a pedestrian état  des  lieux, then we do  not succeed in taking  the debate  
to a  higher level  of  epistemic insight. To the degree, however, that the 
book – as indicated by those who emphatically endorsed it – has delivered  
an  unprecedentedly  methodical,  ﬁne-grained,  and multi-layered account 
of the impact of the  ‘postmodern  turn’  on  the social sciences, it is hardly 
accurate to dismiss its intellectual merits simply by asserting that its 
‘greater systematicity’ has failed to result in  ‘greater insight’. 
I leave it up to each reader to form a judgement on whether or not my 
book has succeeded in accomplishing this ambitious task, which – owing to 
the massive scale of the literature available on postmodern thought – is far 
from straightforward. Irrespective of the conclusions one may reach in 
relation to this issue, it seems only fair to remind McLennan of the fact 
that my study is based on a multifaceted, comprehensive, and critical 
analysis of the impact of the ‘postmodern turn’ on the social sciences. As 
such, it confronts its readers with ample evidence in support of the view 
that postmodern thought constitutes an omnipresent albeit largely implicit 
– feature of social-scientific enquiry in the early twenty-first century. 
  
4.4. Originality 
Another problem that arises when confronted with McLennan’s 
assessment of my book concerns  the issue  of originality. I cannot help but 
think that, in light of the – largely unfounded – accusation that the book 
contains no major original insights, McLennan has not read the entire study 
properly  or  has simply decided to take out his own boredom with 
‘postmodernism’ on the messenger  (or both). 
Consider, for instance, my book’s section on ‘The Arts’9, which seeks not 
only to compare and to contrast, but also, more importantly, to combine (i) 
objectivist, (ii)  normativist,  and (iii)  subjectivist – or, if one  prefers, (i) 
realist, (ii) constructivist, and (iii) perspectivist – conceptions of aesthetic 
experience. I have not come across any such account in the vast literature 
on postmodernism, although I would certainly welcome any commentator 
– including McLennan – to demonstrate not only that the same, or at least 
a very similar, approach has been developed elsewhere by someone else 
but also that it is futile. As I have sought to illustrate in my book, the 
tripartite distinction between (i) objectivist/realist, (ii) 
normativist/constructivist, and (iii) subjectivist/perspectivist conceptions of 
human existence – which is, admittedly, based on a well-known (Kantian-
Marxian-Weberian-Habermasian) distinction between the (i) objective, (ii) 
normative, and (iii) subjective components  of human  life forms10  – has 
profound implications for our understanding of the human  condition.  To 
the extent that we are simultaneously situated in (i) objective, (ii) 
normative,  and (iii) subjective realms of existence, which constitute the 
ontological cornerstones of our lifeworlds, the challenge consists in 
combining and cross-fertilising (i) objectivist/realist, (ii) 
normativist/constructivist, and (iii) subjectivist/perspectivist conceptions of 
human immersion, rather than portraying them as mutually exclusive. It 
would go beyond the scope of this Reply to elucidate  the complexity of the 
aforementioned argument; the fact that McLennan has failed to mention – 
let alone to grapple with – this central part of my study, however, confirms 
my suspicion  that he regards my book as little more than an encyclopaedic 
summary of obsolete and ‘very familiar’ debates (italics in original). 
As both ordinary actors and reflexive scientists, we mobilise (i) 
objectivist/realist, (ii) normativist/constructivist, and (iii) 
subjectivist/perspectivist presuppositions when describing, analysing, 
interpreting, explaining, and/or making value judgements about the 
constitution, the functioning, and the development  of social reality, or of 
particular aspects of social reality (see Susen, 2015, p. 5). In this context, 
 five areas of philosophical enquiry are particularly noteworthy: knowledge  
(epistemology),  being  (ontology/metaphysics),  argument  (logic), 
morality (ethics), and aesthetic forms (aesthetics). All of them can be 
conceptualised in (i) objectivist/realist, (ii) normativist/constructivist, and 
(iii) subjectivist/perspectivist terms; more importantly, and as I have shown 
in my book in relation to aesthetics, all of them can be conceptualised by 
combining these three epistemic perspectives with one another. Granted, 
the far-reaching implications (and complications) of such a radical 
epistemic move have, at best, been tentatively anticipated or, at worst, 
been cursorily simplified in my study. Arguably, another book will have to 
be written to do justice to the complexity of such as macro-theoretic 
endeavour. The ‘postmodern turn’ in the social sciences contains at least a 
Grundriß – that is, a sketchy outline – of this project. This, however, is not 
acknowledged by McLennan, who, when conveying his judgement, prefers 
to prioritise form (structure, systematicity, and length) over content 
(genuine insights). The aforementioned issue is only one example. I could  
provide  several others, but, due to constraints of length, I shall not 
include them here. 
 
4.5. Justification 
Another problem to which McLennan draws attention concerns the alleged 
lack of justification for the book’s ‘strategy’. In this regard, the following 
passage is crucial: 
[…] everyone knows this whole epochal slab of theoretical discussion has 
moved on, even if amorphously. True, most of the ‘beyond the impasse’ 
currents flowing today are still, as Susen insists, somewhat haunted by  
the ‘spectre’ of the unavoidably Manichean ‘debate’. But that is 
insufficient justification for the strategy adopted in this book, which is 
chiefly to try to re-run the whole thing again with minimum reference to 
updates, new contributions, and the changes of heart and tone that 
come simply  with  the  passage of time. Whether it is a matter of 
complexity theory, the ‘new empiricism’, ANT-style questionings of ‘the 
social’, varieties of critical pragmatism, restless attempts to relativise 
without relativism, postsecular and postcolonial über-challenges, or the 
partial revival of Marxism, fresh angles and motives are continually being 
added, and they are not  reducible  to  ‘modernism versus  
postmodernism’. 
Again, each reader will have to judge whether or not I have provided 
sufﬁcient justiﬁcation for the conceptual and methodological strategy 
developed in my book. As should be clear to the attentive reader, the 
 ‘Manichean’ oppositions examined in each chapter are embedded in  the  
architectural  opposition  between ‘modern’ and ‘postmodern’, along  with  
the  underlying  tension between the former’s emphasis on ‘relative 
determinacy’ and the  latter’s  concern with ‘radical indeterminacy’. It will 
be up to my critics  to  give  a verdict on whether or not my enquiry has 
made a strong enough case for the distinction between ‘modern’ and 
‘postmodern’ based on the tension between ‘determinacy’ and 
‘indeterminacy’. Yet, there is not much, if any, room for conﬁrming the 
validity of McLennan’s assertion that the quality of my study suffers from a 
‘minimum reference to updates, new contributions, and the changes of 
heart and tone that come simply with the passage of time’. As a thorough 
look at the bibliography of my book will prove, it contains numerous 
references to precisely the updates, new contributions, and wind changes 
that McLennan has in mind. Indeed, it is ironic that not just some but – 
with one exception – all of the approaches mentioned by McLennan do 
appear in my book: 
 
● complexity theory11; 
● the ‘new empiricism’12; 
● ANT-style questionings of ‘the social’13; 
● varieties of critical pragmatism14; 
● restless attempts to relativise without relativism15; 
● postsecular16 and postcolonial17 über-challenges; 
● the partial revival of Marxism18. 
 
I suppose this is what footballers would call an own goal. The approaches 
that, according to McLennan, have been covered with minimum – if any – 
degree of seriousness in my book have, in fact, all been included and 
represented in an extensive list of bibliographic references. To be sure, 
nowhere in the book do I – as McLennan erroneously asserts – contend 
that these perspectives, and the debates that have arisen around them, are 
‘reducible to “modernism versus postmodernism”’ (italics added). All I 
affirm in relation to these approaches is that their emergence, as well as 
their presuppositional constitution and development, cannot be properly 
understood without taking into account the impact of postmodern thought 
on the social sciences. 
 
 
  
McLennan’s following comment is another proof of the fact that he 
failed to read crucial sections of my study with sufficient attention: 
Critical discourse analysis, for example, is portrayed as coming on to the 
scene very much as a postmodern method, thus being ‘fundamentally 
different’ from modernistic ideology critique (p. 73). But key authors in 
CDA mode do not see it that way, explicitly having sought, after the 
postmodern hit, to retain some philosophically realist elements of 
structural analysis whilst simultaneously accepting the force of the 
discursive-linguistic turn. 
As I explicitly state in relation to ‘critical discourse analysis’ (CDA), 
[…] it would be inappropriate to give the – misleading – impression that 
all forms of discourse analysis are, implicitly or explicitly, ‘postmodern’. 
As this chapter seeks to illustrate, however, it makes sense to conceive of 
discourse analysis as a research method whose theoretical 
presuppositions and practical implications are indicative of the 
paradigmatic shift from the search for relative determinacy to the emphasis 
on radical indeterminacy in current social-scientific debates and 
controversies. In short, the rise of discourse analysis is  one among  other  
symptoms  of  the  far-reaching  impact  of  postmodern thought on the 
contemporary social sciences (Susen, 2015, p. 65; italics in original). 
 
4.6. (Post-) Positivism 
In relation to my chapter on epistemology (Chapter 1),  McLennan  expresses  
serious doubts about the validity of my contention that ‘uncompromising 
opposition to positivist approaches in the social sciences lies at the heart of 
postmodern theories of knowledge’19. He claims that this assertion is 
misleading in at least three respects: 
This is not wrong as such, but it misleads the naïve reader in at least three 
ways, because post-positivism in philosophy, whether in the analytical 
mainstream or on the critical fringe, emerged prior to, and independently of, 
the tide of postmodernism; (b) because many post-positivist thinkers retain a 
minimally realist commitment, whereas the most distinctive conceptual 
component of strong postmodernism is anti-realism; and (c) because serious 
postmodernists do not seek to provide alternative theories of knowledge, they 
reject epistemology altogether (italics in original). 
Let me, in my brief response, draw attention to the following: 
 
 (a) It may well be true that post-positivism entered the scene prior to, and 
independently of, the tide of postmodernism. Indeed, as indicated in 
my study, the same applies to numerous other ‘post-isms’ (see Susen, 
2015, p. 18).  The point is, however, to recognise that the postmodern 
attack on positivist approaches is central to postmodern conceptions 
of knowledge (and ‘anti-knowledge’). 
(b) Nowhere do I suggest that the terms ‘postpositivism’ and 
‘postmodernism’ should be used interchangeably, as McLennan 
erroneously implies in his criticism. He is, in my view, right to stress that 
anti-realism is a constitutive feature of postmodern accounts of 
knowledge. This does not mean, however, that all thinkers whose 
names are – rightly or wrongly – associated with the label 
‘postmodernism’ deny the existence of external and/or internal 
realities. 
(c) It is an exaggeration to affirm, as McLennan does in his review article, 
that ‘serious postmodernists’, rather than seeking to provide 
alternative theories of knowledge, reject epistemology altogether. I 
wonder if McLennan could name at least a handful of ‘serious 
postmodernists’ to whom this statement applies. There would be no 
point in trying to identify, and to problematise, the key assumptions 
underlying postmodern conceptions of epistemology (Chapter 1) if 
‘serious postmodernists’ rejected epistemology  altogether.20 
The aforementioned objections, although they may have entertainment 
value based  on irony and rhetorical provocation,  do not  stand up to 
scrutiny. 
 
4.7. The  ‘cultural turn’ 
According to McLennan, my study suffers from an ‘unreflecting acceptance 
in Chapter 3 of the idea that there was a decisive “cultural turn” in sociology 
(as though sociology has been anything other than mainly culturalist)’ (italics 
added). This criticism results from a reductive reading of Chapter 3. My book 
conceives of the ‘cultural turn’ as one of the most important paradigmatic 
transitions that have taken place within, and considerably shaped the 
development of, sociology in recent decades. Moreover, it maintains that 
the ‘cultural turn’ is intimately intertwined with the ‘postmodern turn’. It 
does not posit, however, that the ‘cultural turn’ has been the only significant 
paradigmatic transition in contemporary sociology, let alone the only one 
linked to the ‘postmodern turn’. Had McLennan read my book more 
 carefully, he would have realised that Chapter 3 contains a detailed section 
(Susen, 2015, pp. 96–101) on numerous paradigmatic developments in 
contemporary sociology. In this section, the following areas of sociological 
investigation are covered: (a) cultural sociology/sociology of culture, (b) 
economic sociology, (c) digital sociology, (d) critical sociology, and (e) political 
sociology. I argue that all of them are relevant to the ‘cultural turn’, in the 
sense that the concept of culture plays a pivotal role in each of these fields 
of enquiry. Nowhere do I posit, however, that they can be reduced to the 
‘cultural turn’ or that all of sociology has gone entirely ‘culturalist’. I am 
afraid that, once again, my argument is more nuanced than McLennan 
would like to admit. 
 
4.8. History 
Another point that deserves attention is McLennan’s accusation that 
Chapter 4 suffers from the ‘violently simplistic summation of “modern 
intellectual thought” […] as the conviction that “the course of history is 
determined by necessity”’ (italics in original). As I spell out in the book, the 
distinction between ‘modern’ and ‘postmodern’ is a controversial one, and 
so are the numerous conceptual oppositions that are rightly or wrongly 
associated with it – in relation to epistemology, social research 
methodology, sociology, historiography, and politics. Of course, it would be 
utterly simplistic to posit that all of modern intellectual thought is based on 
the assumption that the course of history is determined by necessity. The 
aforementioned inverted commas – which McLennan, in his own 
interpretation, ignores – are a way of expressing a critical distance between 
the author and the sets of presuppositions underlying the discursive 
construction of the binary separation between ‘modern’ and ‘postmodern’ 
forms of analysis. Hence, it is not ‘[my] own depiction of the modernist view 
of history’ that is ‘overstated’, but the postmodern depictions – or, rather, 
caricatures – of it. Chapter 4 provides an account of key paradigmatic 
positions in contemporary historiography that – whilst being organised in 
accordance with the crucial, but admittedly controversial, division between 
‘modern’ and ‘postmodern’ approaches – is far more fine-grained than 
McLennan is willing to acknowledge. 
 
4.9. Determinacy/indeterminacy 
As is made explicit on a number of occasions throughout the book, the 
‘postmodern turn’ can be conceived of as a paradigmatic shift from the 
Enlightenment belief in the relative determinacy of both the natural world 
 and the social world to the – increasingly widespread – post-Enlightenment 
belief in the radical indeterminacy of all material and symbolic forms of 
existence.21 Challenging the validity of this contention, McLennan asserts 
that ‘a moment’s thought reveals this claim itself as at least relatively 
deterministic, with the free-floating Platonic take on ideas looking much 
more radically ungrounded’ (italics in original) and that, consequently, 
‘Susen’s keystone formulation loosens and cracks’. As an example, 
McLennan refers to globalisation, which, according to my study, 
postmodern sociologists tend to regard as ‘one of the central processes 
shaping the contemporary world’22, despite the fact that it represents, in 
his words, ‘exactly the sort of epochal, structurationist way of thinking that 
is haughtily scorned by the evangelists of lightning-bolt flashes of uncanny 
illumination’ (italics added). Once again, McLennan ignores the fact that my 
study draws attention to this paradox in particular and to the 
contradictory nature of postmodern thought in general.23 
McLennan is culpable of a similar misrepresentation of my argument 
when affirming that ‘Marxists who have taken the cultural turn are 
bracketed to that extent as being on the postmodern side of things’. In this 
context, McLennan makes reference to my contention that ‘contemporary 
political sociologists – including Marxist ones – are keen to explore various 
degrees of indeterminacy that are present in highly differentiated societies’ 
(Susen, 2015, p. 101). McLennan’s claim that ‘the investigation of “degrees  
of indeterminacy” […] amounts  to exactly the same thing as the 
investigation of degrees of relative determinacy’ (italics added) is 
untenable. The paradigmatic shift from the latter  to  the  former is far 
from insignificant, since it implies that within contemporary sociology – 
including its Marxist, neo-Marxist, and post-Marxist currents – there has 
been a decisive shift away from the attempt to uncover patterns of relative 
determinacy towards recognising the actual or potential complexity of all 
material and symbolic forms of existence in terms of their radical 
indeterminacy. 
To be clear, this is not to posit that, ontologically speaking, there are no 
patterns of determinacy or that, methodologically speaking, it is impossible 
to identify and to examine patterns of determinacy. This is to concede, 
however, that reductionist approaches, notably those embedded in 
determinist and/or monocausalist explanatory frameworks, enjoy far  less  
epistemic  credibility  and ideological legitimacy in the late twentieth and 
early twenty-first centuries than they did previously. Irrespective of 
whether one wishes to conceive of this paradigmatic shift in ‘late modern’ 
or ‘postmodern’ terms, and even if one acknowledges, as I do in Chapter 6, 
 that the scientifically motivated concern with different forms and different 
degrees of indeterminacy long predates the jargon of ‘the postmodern’ as 
well as the alleged advent of ‘postmodernity’, it is difficult to deny that, in 
terms of both breadth and depth, the sustained engagement with different 
forms and different degrees of indeterminacy constitutes an essential 
feature of most contemporary variants of rigorous social-scientific enquiry. 
It is ironic, then, that McLennan states that the aforementioned issue 
stands for ‘something that in the case of politics and ideology Marxists of 
different stripes have been busy addressing since the very outset of their 
tradition’. In fact, had he read my discussions of Marx’s model of ‘base’ 
and ‘superstructure’24 – as well as my critical remarks on this issue in 
Chapter  625 – more carefully, he would have realised that, in my book, this 
was precisely the argument I was  making. 
 
4.10. ‘Modern’ vs. ‘postmodern’ 
McLennan’s concluding paragraph is another example of his crude 
misrepresentation of the conceptual architecture of my book. My study is 
not intended to draw a clear-cut line between ‘the two “sides”’ – that is, 
between ‘the modern’ and ‘the postmodern’. Rather, it aims to 
demonstrate that their binary categorisation is itself deeply problematic to 
the extent that these two concepts reflect ideal types, constructed especially 
by those who, for the right or the wrong reasons, seek to separate the latter 
from the former. Thus, the presuppositional overlap between ‘modern’ and 
‘postmodern’ accounts of epistemology, methodology, sociology, 
historiography, and politics is not simply a matter of ‘conceptual slipping and 
category breaching’, as McLennan erroneously suggests. Even less can it be 
reduced to a rhetorical exercise that obliges us to conceive of 
postmodernism ‘as the business of posing hard modernist questions to 
modernism itself, and leaving them hanging’. In a more fundamental sense, 
it represents a major theoretical  and practical challenge that, if taken 
seriously, requires us to face up to the numerous paradigmatic changes 
that have shaped the development of the contemporary social sciences in a 
profound manner and whose multifaceted complexity can be grasped only 
by virtue of a fine-grained analysis of its implications and consequences. 
In short, the critical examination of the impact of the ‘postmodern turn’ 
on  the contemporary social sciences requires us not to grind through 
‘necessarily wooden contrapositions […] all again’, but, rather, to do justice 
to the complexity underlying the paradigmatic shift from the 
Enlightenment concern with determinacy to the post-Enlightenment 
engagement with indeterminacy – a significant transition that is irreducible 
 to a language game whose value is based on mere semantics and fancy 
rhetoric. Today, in the twenty-first century, the idea of a ‘qualified 
modernist position’ is inconceivable if those who seek to defend it fail to 
engage critically and systematically with ‘qualified postmodernism’– that is, 
with both the obvious and the hidden traces that the presuppositional 
conglomerate known as ‘the postmodern turn’ has left not only in ordinary 
and intellectual imaginaries but also in contemporary social realities. 
 
 
Notes 
 
1. Unless otherwise indicated, quoted passages in this Reply are taken from 
McLennan (2017). 
2. Giddens (1990), p. 1. On Giddens’s conception of ‘modernity’, see 
Giddens (1990), esp. pp. 1–17 and 45–54. Cf. Outhwaite (2014). 
3. On the concept of ‘qualified modernism’, see McLennan  (2017). 
4. On this point, see, for instance, Susen (2015), pp. 37 and  232. 
5. On this point, see, for example, Susen (2015), pp. 232–233 and 278. 
6. It is worth mentioning that the publishers, Palgrave Macmillan, would 
have preferred to omit the inverted commas in the title – probably 
because, from a commercial point of view, it makes sense to avoid 
cumbersome book titles, even in the field of academic publishing. 
7. It should be noted that most of the other hitherto published reviews of 
my book are largely favourable in their assessment. See, for example: 
Burton (2015); Fach (2016); Feather (2016); Gane (2016); Hazelrigg 
(2016); Mele (2017); Miranda González (2016); Munslow (2016); 
Outhwaite (2016); Salinas (2016); Toews (2016). See also Susen (2016). In 
addition, references to The ‘postmodern turn’ in the social sciences can 
be found, for instance, in the following sources: Alanen (2016); 
Bachmann-Medick (2015/2016); Cordero (2017); How (2016), esp. 
Chapter 5; Jacobsen and Walklate (2017); Olsson (2016); Tamara (2016); 
Warde (2017); Visoka and Richmond (2016). 
8. See Susen (2015), pp. 341–398. 
 9. See Susen (2015), pp. 101–103. 
10. Cf. Susen (2007), pp. 23, 38–39, 43n25, 44n37, 75–88, 104–107, 115, 127n21, 
275–302,  and 307. 
11. See, for instance: Chesters and Welsh (2005); Cilliers (1998); Lahire 
(1998); Susen (2010). 
12. This ‘new empiricism’ is the exception. Yet, my book contains numerous 
passages and references that are related to this topic. On the ‘empirical 
turn’, see Susen (2015), p. 34. On the concept of ‘empiricism’, see Susen 
(2015), pp. 49, 68, 149, and 262. On the concept of ‘the empirical’, see 
Susen (2015), pp. 14, 21, 22, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 55, 56, 57, 58, 68, 77, 
80, 86, 87, 93, 95, 125, 128, 130 131, 132, 139, 140, 144, 149, 207, 211, 
215, 217, 234, 238, 242, 255, 260, 262, 263, 264, 268, and 280. 
13. See, for instance: Latour (1990); Latour (2005); Sismondo (2004/2010); 
Wilding (2010). 
14. See, for instance: Aboulafia, Bookman, and Kemp (2002); Alexander 
(2004); Apel (1979); Baert (2003); Baert (2005), pp. 126–145 and 146–
169; Baert and da Silva (1998/2010), pp. 285–307; Baert and da Silva 
(2013); Baert and Turner (2007); Blokker (2011); Boltanski (1990); 
Boltanski (1999–2000); Boltanski (2009); Boltanski and Honneth (2009); 
Boltanski, Rennes, and Susen (2010); Boltanski and Thévenot (1991); 
Boltanski and Thévenot (1999); Celikates (2009); Margolis (1986/2007); 
McLaughlin and White (2012); Susen (2011); Susen (2012b); Susen 
(2013); Susen and Turner (2014). 
15. See, for instance: Bourdieu (1999); Rorty (1982); Rorty (1985); Rorty 
(1989); Rorty (1991a); Rorty (1991d); Rorty (1991b); Rorty (1991c); Rorty 
(1997b); Rorty (1997a); Rorty (1998a); Rorty (1998b); Rorty (1979/2009). 
16. See, for instance: Abeysekara (2008); Baker and Beaumont (2011); Blond 
(1997); Dostert (2006); Habermas (2008/2010); Hamilton (2008); Martin 
(1996); Mavelli (2012); Milbank (1992); Mohamed (2011); Molendijk, 
Beaumont, and Jedan (2010); Nynäs, Lassander, and Utriainen (2012); 
Rubinstein (2009); Smith and Whistler (2011); Vries and Sullivan (2006). 
17. See, for instance: Amin-Khan (2012); Bhambra (2007); Brantlinger (2011); 
Carp (2010); Chatterjee (1993); Cornis-Pope (2012); Hoogvelt (1997). 
 18. See, for instance: Bonefeld, Gunn, and Psychopedis (1991); Bonefeld, 
Gunn, and Psychopedis (1992); Bonefeld, Gunn, Holloway,  and  
Psychopedis (1995); Browne and Susen (2014), esp. pp. 224–229; Butler 
(1998); Callari and Ruccio (1996a); Callari and Ruccio (1996b); Callinicos 
(1989); Carver (1998); Cloud (1994); Cole (2003); Daly (1999); de Lara 
(1982); Eagleton (1995); Foster (1997/2006); Geras (1987); Hall (1977); 
Holloway (2002/2005); Holloway (2010); Holloway and Susen (2013), pp. 
31–32 and 36; Kellner (1989b); Kellner (1989a); Laclau (1989); Laclau 
(1992); Laclau (1993); Laclau (1996); Laclau (2007); Laclau and Mouffe 
(1987) ; Laclau and Mouffe (1985/2001); Landry (2000); Malpas (2001), 
Chapters 8 and 9; Malpas (2005); McMahon (1999); Mouffe (1996); 
Mulhern (1997/2006); Rehmann (2004); Reitz (2004); Rundell (1990); 
Smart (1992), Chapter 6; Steiner (2008); Susen (2012a), esp. pp. 283–291; 
Torfing (1999); Vakaloulis (2001); Vester (2008); Weber (1995); Wolff 
(2004); Wood  (1997/2006); Wood and Foster (1997/2006); Žižek (2000). 
19. Susen (2015), p. 48 (italics in original); ‘lies’, rather than ‘lie’; McLennan 
misquotes me here. 
20. On the relationship between postmodernism and epistemology, see, for 
example: Alexander (1992); Benhabib (1990); Clark (2006); Delanty (2000); 
Harding (1992); Inayatullah (1990); Jørgensen  (2002);  McKinley  (2003);  
Nola  and  Irzik (2003); Rolfe (1997); Santos (2007); Susen (2015),  esp.  
Chapter  1;  Wersig (1993). 
21. On this point, see Susen (2015), pp. 1, 9, 19, 39, 48, 59, 65, 66, 69, 72, 74, 82, 
90, 92, 93, 104, 137, 138, 139, 166, 180, 233, 258, 264, 265, 268, and 278. 
22. Susen (2015), pp. 128–129. See also McLennan (2017). 
23. See Susen (2015), Chapter 6, esp. pp. 238–240. 
24. See  Susen  (2015),  pp.  90,  91,  97,  99,  100,  101,  265,  295n27,  298n31, 
and 300n110. 
25. See Susen (2015), Chapter 6, esp. pp. 238–239 and 239–241. 
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